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Patent Litigation with Endogenous Disputes 
 
By James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer* 
 
The recent explosion of patenting and patent disputes has sparked a growing literature on 
the economics of patent litigation. Generally, models in this literature take the existence of a 
dispute as given. This assumption, however, limits the empirical relevance of these studies.  
Disputes would not arise if all technology adopters obtained ex ante licenses from patent 
owners. This suggests that two stories could explain the origin of patent disputes. In one, the 
technology adopter observes a patented technology, but chooses to imitate, “inventing around” 
and/or hiding the infringement. In the other, the adopter develops its own technology and is 
unaware of another firm’s putative patent rights. This kind of innocent infringement occurs 
because patent rights often have uncertain boundaries or questionable validity. In addition, the 
sheer number of patents facing a typical innovator makes careful assessment quite burdensome. 
Furthermore, patent claims are often hidden (sometimes strategically) until after firms have sunk 
technology investments. 
These two accounts suggest that a model of disputes should consider: the decisions of 
patent owners to invent, to patent, and to monitor use of the patented technology by others; and 
the decisions of potential infringers to monitor extant patents, and develop and adopt new 
technology. Claude Crampes and Corinne Langinier (2002) endogenize disputes by focusing on a 
patent owner’s monitoring activity and imitative behavior by potential infringers. Our model 
includes this behavior,  but it also includes defendants who “invent around” a patent, and 
defendants who are unaware of the patented technology. We find that this richer model provides 
comparative statics that better match empirical evidence on patent litigation. 
 
I. A Model of Patent Disputes 
Our model (fully described in our working paper Bessen and Meurer (2006)) embeds a 
standard model of patent dispute resolution based on Meurer (1989), in a framework with early-
stage patent and development investments by a patent owner and a potential defendant. The 
model has three stages. In stage one, firm 1 chooses an investment, P1, in patent “refinement.” 
We assume firm 1 has an exogenously given invention, and chooses a level of patent protection 
that influences the probability (actually a distribution of probabilities) of successfully suing firm 
2 for patent infringement. Firm 1 can “refine” its patent protection to improve its probability by 
obtaining multiple patents, delaying the issuance of some of its patents through continuation   2 
practice, crafting multiple claims, investing in high quality claims and disclosures, conducting a 
careful prior art search, and also by monitoring the activities of firm 2. We assume a constant 
marginal and average cost of refinement, ￿.  
In stage two, firms 1 and 2 simultaneously choose development investments, x1 and x2. 
We assume a constant marginal and average cost of development, ￿i. In stage three, the firms 
decide whether to dispute infringement and if so, they then decide whether to enter a license 
agreement or file a lawsuit. 
We assume the firms hold symmetric information throughout the game. Between stages 
two and three, the firms observe the probability ￿ that firm 1 could win an infringement suit 
against firm 2. At the earlier stages the firms know that ￿ is distributed over [0, 1] according to 
the distribution function F(￿; P1 , x2). We assume that P1 and x2 induce shifts of F that satisfy first 
order stochastic dominance. It is natural to assume that P1 and x2 influence the distribution ￿. A 
patent dispute only arises when firm 2 adopts a technology that arguably falls within the scope of 
at least one of firm 1’s patents. Firm 1 can improve its prospect at trial by investing more in 
patent refinement which shifts the distribution to the right, and firm 2 can affect its prospect at 
trial through its development investment. Possibly, firm 2 increases its exposure to a lawsuit by 
increasing it development investment; alternatively, firm 2 might reduce the probability of a 
successful suit by developing around the claim language in firm 1’s patents, or by hiding its 
infringement. For now, we leave open the possibility that x2 shifts the distribution either right or 
left. 
In stage three, there are four possible outcomes:  
1. Firm 2 observes ￿ and decides to abandon its newly adopted technology 
(“deterrence”). Firm 1 gets a monopoly payoff M(x1) and firm 2 gets zero. 
2. Firm 2 does not abandon the technology, but firm 1 does not assert its patent 
(“acquiescence”). The firms get duopoly profits D1(x1) and D2(x2) respectively.  
3. Firm 1 asserts its patents and the firms bargain to a settlement. The payoffs are Nash 
bargaining solutions, S1 and S2. Let ￿(￿, x1, x2) denote the joint profit from settlement, ￿(￿, x1, x2)  
=  S1  + S2. Development investments could spill-over to raise the joint profit from settlement, but 
in the basic model we assume they have idiosyncratic value to the investor. 
4. If bargaining breaks down, the firms litigate with payoffs L1(￿, x1) and L2(￿, x2). Firm 
1 may sue because it gains advantages including: (a) a reputation for litigiousness, (b) avoidance 
of settlement cost, such as dissipation of rents under settlement; and (c) enhanced exclusionary 
value of a successfully litigated patent.   3 
Naturally, the litigation payoffs depend on the probability that the patentee wins the 
lawsuit. We also allow the settlement payoffs to depend on this probability, because the rigor of 
antitrust regulation of patent licenses depends on the strength of the threatened patent suit. At one 
extreme, simple prosecution of a patent lawsuit can lead to antitrust liability if the suit is baseless. 
Also, output restrictions negotiated under the cover of sham patent licenses have resulted in 
antitrust liability. At the other extreme, courts have shown extreme deference to licenses 
involving strong patents. In particular, we assume that ￿(L1 +  L2)/￿￿ > ￿ ￿/￿￿ > 0 > ￿L2/￿￿, and 
that M, D1, and D2, are independent of ￿. This condition is required for equilibrium litigation and 
is consistent with our explanations above.
1 
 
II. Settlement, Lawsuit, Acquiescence or Deterrence 
We find a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by analyzing backwards through the three-
stage game. In general, there are four solution regions as shown in Figure 1. The solution 
boundaries between these regions are: 
1.  ￿A solves L1 (￿) = D1. When L1 < D1 , firm 1 lacks a credible threat of litigation and 
we assume that antitrust restrictions prohibit settlement, leading to acquiescence.
2 
2. ￿L solves L1 (￿) + L2 (￿) = ￿(￿). For ￿ Î [￿A, ￿L], both parties have a credible threat of 
suit, and the parties reach a license with S1 = (½)(￿ + L1 - L2), and S2 = (½)(￿ + L2 – L1). For  
￿ Î (￿L, ￿D), a lawsuit is filed, firm 1 earns L1 and firm 2 earns L2. 
3. ￿D solves L2 (￿) = 0. For ￿ Î [￿D, 1], the alleged infringer cannot credibly defend a 
suit and drops out. 
Given our assumptions we have unique solutions such that, 0 < ￿A < ￿L < ￿D < 1.
3 
Figure 1 also displays the third-stage profit Vi for each firm as a function of the 
probability of a successful lawsuit ￿. As might be expected, a stronger patent suit helps firm 1 and 
hurts firm 2; the profit of firm 1 weakly increases in ￿, and the profit of firm 2 weakly decreases 




III. Patent Refinement and Development Investment 
At stage one when firm 1 makes patent investments and at stage two when firms 1 and 2 
make simultaneous development investments, they believe the strength of a potential patent 
lawsuit by 1 against 2 has a probability distribution F(￿; P1; x2). The firms look ahead to stage 
three using F to calculate the expected payoffs given acquiescence, settlement, litigation or 
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Recall Vi(￿) denotes the profit to firm i at stage 3, marginal cost of development is denoted i d , 
and marginal cost of patent refinement is denoted ￿. The analysis in our working paper provides 
conditions on F sufficient to guarantee a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which x1 
and x2 are strategic substitutes. 
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Dispute Region   5 
IV. Testable Implications of the Model  
Our model of patent disputes generates a variety of comparative static results that we 
investigate empirically in Bessen and Meurer (2005). Consider two randomly selected firms. 
What determines the probability that one will file a lawsuit against the other? The probability of 
litigation is l = F(￿D; P1, x2) – F(￿L; P1, x2). Referring to Figure 1, this is the portion of the 
distribution F that falls between ￿L and ￿D. Generally, two sorts of effects will influence this 
probability: factors that move ￿L and ￿D, and factors that shift F. 
Since our empirical investigation, unlike previous empirical studies, controls for the 
characteristics of both parties in the suits, it suffices to look at direct effects on the probability of 
litigation. These effects are (letting f be the probability density function): 
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These equations provide a framework for thinking about empirical results and the two 
sorts of influences. Generally, x1 and x2 influence ￿L and ￿D through the effect R&D has on the 
stakes each firm has at risk in litigation. Consider the effect of the patent holder’s R&D,  1 dx dl . 
If the industry is such that additional R&D investment allows firms to earn large additional 
profits (e.g., patent rents), then R&D investment will lead to greater gains from litigation, shifting 
￿L to the left (firm 1 would rather sue than settle). All else equal, a patent holder who invests 
more in R&D in such an industry will be more likely to sue. We find evidence that R&D 
spending by patent holders in the pharmaceutical and chemical industries—where patent rents are 
high—increases the probability of suit, but not in other industries, where patent appropriability is 
not so high. When we control for firm profits (actually, firm market value) to control ￿L, this 
effect becomes insignificant in all industries, consistent with the theoretical model. 
Shifts in the distribution F provide another margin of influence. We assume that the 
probability distribution is massed to the left, at low values of a. This assumption is motivated by 
the observation that technologies are diverse and that most pairs of randomly chosen firms will 
have very different technologies, unlikely to infringe each other’s patents. In the empirical paper 
we construct a measure of technological distance and find support for this assumption.   6 
This means that if, say, P1 shifts the distribution to the right, then this will increase the 
probability of litigation—more mass will fall between ￿L and ￿D.
4 Since greater patent 
refinement—more patents, better quality patents, better monitoring, etc.—should shift F to the 
right, this is exactly the relationship we should expect, and we do, indeed, find that firms with 
larger portfolios are more likely to sue, all else equal. 
Similarly, firm 2’s R&D spending, x2, may also shift the distribution, but this effect could 
be positive or negative. If firm 2 uses development investment mainly to “invent around” patents 
or aid piracy, then probability mass is shifted to the left out of the litigation interval—with this 
sort of infringement avoidance, firm 2 would be less likely to be found to infringe. Alternatively, 
if increasing firm 2’s development investment exposes it to greater risk of inadvertent 
infringement, then probability mass is shifted to the right into the litigation interval. When we 
include firm profits (market value) in the regression to control for ￿L and ￿D, we find a strong 
positive effect of firm 2’s R&D on the probability of litigation. This suggests that most 
defendants are inadvertent infringers rather than pirates or firms attempting to cheat by inventing 
around.
5 
The distribution of trial outcome probabilities is affected not only by the endogenous 
patenting and development choices of the firms, but also by a variety of exogenous factors of 
interest to us. This framework can also be used to think about policy changes. For example, 
relaxed antitrust rules increase the attractiveness of settlement, shifting ￿L to the right, while 
reduced litigation cost and larger rents increase the attractiveness of litigation, moving it left. 
Similarly, legal changes that expand the scope of patent rights or make patent boundaries less 
clear would shift the distribution F to the right. 
V. Conclusion: Vague Property Rights, Patent Disputes, and Patent Lawsuits  
In an ideal (though not necessarily optimal) patent system in which validity and scope are 
clear, potential patent lawsuits would result in either a certain win or a certain loss for the patent 
owner. Then there would not be any patent disputes or lawsuits filed.
6 Innovative firms would 
seek an ex ante license or avoid adopting patented technology. And patent owning firms would 
have no incentive to make strategic investments in patent refinement. The distribution of F would 
be bi-modal, falling entirely within the acquiescence and deterrence regions. 
In contrast, in our model the vagueness of patent rights leaves firms unsure about the 
strength of a potential patent lawsuit. In equilibrium, there are patent disputes, i.e., ex post 
settlement and litigation, when the realization of ￿ falls into the interval [￿A, ￿D), and there are 
(observable) lawsuits filed when ￿ falls into the interval (￿F, ￿D).   7 
Our model provides a framework for analyzing patent law changes affecting the certainty 
of patent rights. In the early 1980s, all patent appeals were consolidated in the newly created 
Federal Circuit. One goal of this change was to increase the clarity of patent rights. In the mid 
1990s, patent claim construction was moved from juries to judges; again, one goal of this change 
was to increase the clarity of patent rights. 
Clearly, if these reforms succeeded, then we should observe a reduction in lawsuits. More 
subtly, the model also provides a framework for predicting the effect of these reforms on the 
profit, development investment, and patenting behavior of innovative firms. We plan to 
investigate these effects in future work, and we hope to learn whether patent vagueness is a 
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1 We refer the reader to our working paper Bessen and Meurer (2006) for other 
assumptions about the third stage payoffs.   8 
                                                                                                                                                              
2 Shapiro (2003) discusses settlement of lawsuits involving weak patents. 
3 The proofs of this and all other results are contained in the working paper. 
4 This inference actually requires a slightly stronger assumption: that the probability 
density, f, monotonically decreases. Given the evidence that the probability mass is concentrated 
at low values of a, this would seem to be a parsimonious assumption for a large sample of diverse 
firms. 
5 In addition, we find that most defendants spend heavily on R&D—they are not simple 
copyists. Also, a substantial portion of lawsuits occur between firms that are in completely 
different industries and are technologically distant, again suggesting inadvertent or unavoidable 
infringement. 
6 Ignoring private information and other causes of litigation. 